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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF RECENT FEDERAL OASES ON SUSPENSION o THE
WASHINGTON GENERAL ASSIGNMENT LAW BY OPERATION
OF THE FEDERAL, BANIRUPTCY ACT

Since Armour & Co. v. Becker" the Washington court has made
clear its position on suspension of our general assignment law2 by
the Bankruptcy Act. In Tacoma Grocery Co. v. Doersch on
authority of the Armour case and Interatwnal Siwe Co. v. PTnkus

a non-assenting creditor was permitted to garnishee the assigned
property in the hands of the assignee. A few months later in
Anderson v. Zelensky 5 a creditor who had not taken under a gen-

eral assignment recovered judgment on his claim despite the
debtor's discharge pursuant to Rem. Com. Stat. see. 1100. 6
The only conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing
decisions is that so far as the Washington court is concerned both

the discharge and regulatory sections of the Washington general
assignment statute are no longer operative. That such a holding
was required by the then exant United States Supreme Court decisions may be questioned. The Arkansas statute" which produced
the Pinkus case can be distinguished from the Washington statute.8
Howsoever that may be there are two later Supreme Court cases

relating to suspension of state insolvency laws by the Bankruptcy
Act which appear to change the entire complexion of the problem.
Much has been written elsewhere concerning these cases9 and
it is sufficient for our purposes to briefly summarize the holdings
167 Wash. 245, 9 Pac. (2d) 63 (1932). See the comment on this case,
7 Wash. Law Rev. 289. In the decision of the Armour case Boese v. King,
108 U. S. 379, 27 L. ed. 760, 2 S. Ct. Rep. 765 (1883) In re Tarnowskz,
191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926), and International
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 73 L. ed. 318, 49 S. Ct. Rep. 108 (1928)
were cited. The two former cases axe certainly not authority for the
proposition that a state liquidation statute is wholly bad because it
contains a discharge section. In Boese v. King non-assenting creditors
were held to be unable to levy on the assigned property under an assignment made pursuant to the New Jersey statute. That In re Tarnowsk-t
is authority only for the proposition that the discharge section of the
Wisconsin statute is severable and suspended is indicated by Hazelwood
v. Olinger Bldg. Dept. Store, 205 Wis. 85, 236 N. W 591 (1931). The
Pinkus case held that the Arkansas insolvency statute, Chap. 93 Kirby &
Castle Dig. (1916), was suspended zn tote. In its decision the Supreme
Court placed some emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff's claim was less
than $500 thus precluding the possibility of an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy by the plaintiff alone. This circumstance was pointed out by
the court m the Armour case, where the plaintiff's claim was for $293.14.
The point has not been discussed, in later Supreme Court decisions.
2 Rem. Rev. Stat. Title 7, chap. 5, sec. 1086 et seq.
'168 Wash. 606, 12 Pac. (2d) 929 (1932)
'Note 1, supra.
r170 Wash. 137, 15 Pac. (2d) 934 (1932).
'There was a second basis for the decision in Anderson v. Zelensky.
Proper notice of the assignment proceedings was not given ,the creditor.
?Kirby & Castle Dig. (1916), chap. 93.
4The Arkansas statute was labelled by the legislature as an insolvency
act. Creditors may share in the assigned estate only upon filing a certificate agreeing to discharge -the debtor in full. Arkansas has a separate
statute relating to general assignments. Chap. 93 sets up state machinery
for liquidation of an insolvent estate upon petition of the debtor.
42 Yale L. Jour. 1140; 32 Mich. L. Rev. 93; 8 Wis. L. Rev. 282; 11
Tex. L. Rev. 381.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
as follows Pobreslo v. Boyd ° upheld the validity of the regulatory sections of the Wisconsin statute,1 1 which statute is much
similar to that of Washington.1 2 Johnson v. Star13 seems to mdicate that the Supreme Court will adopt the interpretation given
by the state court to the local law, if the state court holds that
the local statute does not conflict with the Federal Act then the
Supreme Court will so hold even though the statute in question
provides for discharge of the debtor. The Texas statute was under
consideration in the case, it provides for discharge only as to creditors who have shared in the distributions made under the assignment and who have received at least one-third of the amount of
their claims. 4
In view of the present wording of Rem. Rev Stat. see. 110015
the significance of Johnson v. Star in so far as it relates to the
possibility of sustaining statutes containing a discharge section
not severed from the remainder of the statute may not be great
in this state. But there is apparently nothing indicated in Title 7,
chap. 5 of the code which militates against severance of see. 1100
therefrom. With that section severed and suspended there is little
doubt but what a decision upholding the regulatory sections of
chapter 5 would now be affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court.
WARREN SHATTUCK.
30287 U. S. 518, 77 L. ed. 469, 53 S. Ct. Rep. 262 (1932).
Here the
facts are similar to those in Tacova Grocery Co. V. Doersch. A nonassenting cred-itor sought to garnishee the assignee and the state court's
holding that the garnishee action should be dismissed was affirmed. The
Supreme Court stated: "In the case now before us the Wisconsin statutory provisions relating to discharge of insolvent debtors were not invoked. There is nothing in the assignment, the application to the circuit
court to take jurisdiction, or its order thereon, to suggest that the discharge of the assignor was contemplated. The provisions regulating the
administration of trusts created by voluntary assignments for the benefit
of creditors apply whether the assignor is solvent or insolvent. They
do not prevent creditors from bringing action against the debtor or require those seeking to participate in the distribution of the estate to
stipulate for his d-ischarge. And, quite in harmony with the purposes
of the federal act, the provisions of c.128 that are regulatory of such
voluntary assignments serve to protect creditors against each other and

go to assure equality of distribution unaffected by any requirement or
condition in respect to discharge."
1Wis. Stat. (1927) sec. 128.
12The discharge section of the Wisconsin statute has been held suspended by the state court. In re Tarnowskz, note 1, supra.
Is287 U. S. 527, 77 L. ed. 473, 53 S. Ct. Rep. 265 (1932). The facts
were similar to those in the Pobreslo case. The discharge section of the
Texas statute involved has been held suspended by the state court. Star
v. Johnson, 44 S. W (2d) 429 (Tex. 1931). The Supreme Court held
that a non-assenting creditor could not garnishee the assignee, which
holding did not of itself add anything to the decision in Pobreslo v. Boyd.
But from the language employed inferences of considerable import may
be drawn.
"Tex. Stat. (1928) Title 22, art. 261-274. It will be noted that such
a discharge section in its practical effect achieves much the same result
as would a voluntary composition of creditors-a circumstance of moment
since the Texas statute must be considered in any attempt to evaluate
Johnson v. Star
16This section reads in part: "The judge of the court having jurisdiction of the matter shall, upon the allowance of the final account of
the assignee, make an order discharging the assignor or assignors as
the case may be from any further liability on account of any indebted-

